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Ranchers' Clauns to Semi-Ownership of Federal Lands?
Mark Epperson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Taylor Grazing Act (TGA), passed in 1934, gave the Secretary of
the Interior (Secretary) the authority to establish grazing districts on federal
land.' The object of the grazing districts was to regulate the occupancy and
use of the public lands; to protect those lands from destruction or injury;
and to provide for "the orderly use, improvement, and development of the
range." 2 The TGA authorized the Secretary to issue permits to graze live-
stock on the districts, with preference given to landowners engaged in the
livestock business, legitimate occupants or settlers, or owners of water
rights, who are within or near the districts, "as may be necessary to permit
the proper use" of the land or water rights the permut recipient owned.' A
permit is valid for a maximum of ten years, and the permit holder has prior-
ity over others upon renewal, but the Secretary can specify "from time to
time numbers of stock and seasons of use."4 The pernt holder's recogmzed
grazing privileges are to be "adequately safeguarded," but only "[s]o far as
consistent with the purposes of this subchapter."5 The issuance of a permit
does not create any "right, title, interest, or estate" to federal land.6
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), enacted in
1976, directs the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the federal agency
entrusted with managing the public lands, to manage its lands for multiple
uses and sustained yield.7 Basically, this means that all resources derived
from BLM lands be produced at high levels on a consistent basis, without
permanent damage to the land's productivity or environmental quality The
BLM must consider the present and future needs of the American people,
including the country's need for domestically produced commodities like
food, when drawing up land use plans.' These resources do not necessarily
need to be managed to produce the greatest econonuc return. 9 FLPMA was
passed partly in response to inadequate protection of the land under the
TGA. "Congress finds that a substantial amount of the Federal range is
* J.D. expected 2002 Umversity of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont.
1. 43 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1934).
2. Id




7. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1976).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1976), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(12) (1976).
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
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deteriorating in quality "10
The Secretary is empowered under FLPMA to incorporate an allot-
ment management plan (AMP) into a grazing permit. AMPs are to be tai-
lored to the condition of the range in the area they cover, and must be
reviewed periodically to determine their effectiveness in improving range
conditions." Where an AMP is not incorporated into a grazing permit, the
Secretary is required to specify in the permit: 1) the number of animals to
be grazed and seasons of use; and 2) the Secretary's right to reexamine
range conditions at any time and adjust grazing use if needed.12 Grazing
permits shall be issued "consistent with such terms and conditions" the Sec-
retary believes are required by governing law, and he can cancel, suspend,
or modify the permit, in whole or in part, "pursuant to the terms and condi-
tions" of the permit.13
The Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA) clarified the BLM's
management goals for grazing lands. Improving range conditions is the
highest priority, due to its unsatisfactory condition over vast areas. 14 In
passing PRIA Congress stated that "grazing cutbacks or rest periods" could
be useful to promoting range recovery, and that it was aware overgrazing
occurred in many areas and had to be curtailed. 5
In regulations promulgated in 1978, the BLM defined the term "graz-
ing preference" to mean "the total number of animal unit months [AUMs]
of livestock grazing on public lands apportioned and attached to base prop-
erty owned or controlled by the permittee."16 An AUM is the amount of
forage necessary to sustain for one month, one cow, one horse, five sheep,
or five goats. 7 The grazing preference included "active use," the current
authorized grazing level, based on the amount of forage available for live-
stock specified in a land use plan, and "suspended use," which could be
converted to active use if the allotment's forage production increased."i
This definition remained unchanged until 1995, when BLM redefined
"grazing preference" as a "superior or priority position against others for
10. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 154 F.3d 1160, 1163-1164 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
528 U.S. 926, (1999), affid 529 U.S. 728 (2000) (hereinafter Public Lands Council II) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1163, at 1 (1976)).
11. 43 U.S.C. §1752(d) (1934).
12. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(e) (1934).
13. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (1934).
14. 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(4) (1978).
15. George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Range Management IV- FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multi-
ple Use Mandates, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, n. 916 (1983-84) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1122, at 11 (1978)).
16. Public Lands Council II, 154 F.3d at 1164 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1994)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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the purpose of receiving a grazing permit."' 19 The term "permitted use,"
defined as the forage allocated by the applicable land use plan for grazing in
an allotment, including active and suspended use, was added.20
The 1995 regulations also changed the requirement, dating from a
1942 regulation, that only those persons actually "engaged in the livestock
business" were eligible for grazing permits.2 The 1995 regulations elirm-
nated the phrase "engaged in the livestock business" from its definition of
those qualifying for a grazing permit (the qualifications rule).22
The TGA stipulated that permit owners could make range improve-
ments - such as building fences, drilling wells, or spraying for weeds - on
BLM lands, provided they did so in accordance with either a cooperative
agreement with the federal government or a range improvement permt.23
Prior to 1995, BLM regulations pertaining to cooperative agreements gave
the Umted States full title to "nonstructural improvements" like weed
spraying and "non-removable" improvements like wells.2 4 But structural
and removable improvements like stock tanks, fencing, or pipelines were to
be shared between the permit holder and the Umted States "in proportion to
the actual amount of the respective contribution to the initial construc-
tion."'2 The 1995 regulations changed the rules regarding title to range im-
provements made pursuant to a cooperative agreement. The new regulations
state that title to all permanent range improvements built in the future "such
as fences, wells, and pipelines" shall belong to the Umted States.26
The Public Lands Council (PLC) and several livestock associations
brought suit in federal court challenging the new regulations. In Public
Lands Council v. Babbitt, the PLC appealed the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals' ruling that the permitted use rule,27 the permanent range improve-
ments rule, and the qualifications rule did not violate the TGA.28 The PLC
argued the new regulations violated the TGA's requirement that recognized
and acknowledged grazing privileges be adequately safeguarded.2 9 In par-
19. Id. at 1165 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5).
20. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-2 (1995)).
21. Public Lands Council v. Babbit, 529 U.S. 728, 745 (2000) (hereinafter Public Lands Council
i) (citing 1942 Range Code § 3(a)).
22. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(a) (1995).
23. 43 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1934).
24. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2 (1994).
25. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-3(b) (1994).
26. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-2(b) (1995).
27. "Permitted use rule" includes the redefinition of "grazing preference" and the term "permitted
use" in the 1995 regulations.
28. Public Lands Council I1, 529 U.S. at 745.
29. Id. at 739-41.
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ticular, the PLC claimed the permitted use rule was inconsistent with Con-
gress' s goal of stabilizing the livestock industry expressed in the TGA pre-
amble.3" The permitted use rule was also challenged on the grounds that it
represented a break with an established and contemporaneous agency inter-
pretation of the TGA and FLPMA.3 1
The PLC asserted the qualifications rule violated section 315(b) of the
TGA.3" In the PLC's interpretation, that subsection limited the eligibility
for grazing permits to "stock owners."33 The PLC believed that in 1934 a
"stock owner" referred only to persons "engaged in the livestock business,"
not those who merely owned livestock.34 The PLC feared the qualifications
rule would allow people or organizations owning minimal numbers of live-
stock to acquire a grazing permit, and, intending to graze few or no animals,
use the permit for conservation purposes, thereby excluding grazing from
those allotments.
35
The PLC also claimed the range improvements rule violated TGA sec-
tion 315(c), which requires that before new permit applicants can receive
their permit, they must compensate prior occupants for the reasonable value
of range improvements constructed and owned by the prior occupant. 36 In
the PLC's view, the word "owned" anticipated that the prior occupant
owned some of these improvements; an interpretation they say was denied
by the new rule, under which all future permanent range improvements will
be owned by the United States. 37 The Secretary claimed the rules did not
conflict with the plain language of either the TGA, FLPMA, or PRIA, so
the courts must defer to the Secretary's rulemaking authority 38
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that: 1) the permitted use
rule does not violate the TGA's mandate that grazing privileges be ade-
quately safeguarded because the Act gives the Secretary a great deal of
discretion to determine how those privileges will be protected; 39 2) the per-
mitted use rule does not automatically reduce the security of existing graz-
ing privileges;4" 3) the qualifications rule is valid because the TGA does not
30. Public Lands Council H, 154 F.3d at 1184 (citing Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269
(1934) (uncodified)).
31. Brief for Petitioners at 9-14 (No. 98-1991).
32. Public Lands Council III, 529 U.S. at 746.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 745.
35. Id. at 747 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 47-48 (No. 98-1991)).
36. Id. at 749.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 741-42.
40. Id. at 743.
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expressly require that grazing permits should only be issued to those en-
gaged in the livestock busmess; 41 4) few grazing permits will be issued to
stock owners who are not in the livestock business because other BLM
regulations mandate permut holders substantially graze their allotments;42
and 5) nothing in the TGA prohibited the Secretary from changing the rules
on ownership of some range improvements constructed pursuant to a coop-
erative agreement.43
In upholding the permitted use rule, the Supreme Court recognized that
by mandating the land be protected and managed for multiple uses, the
TGA and FLPMA give the Secretary the power to disregard adjudications
that determined the maximum amount of forage each permittee could utilize
in optimal conditions. By upholding the qualifications and range improve-
ments rules, the Court affirmed the Secretary's clear authority under the
TGA to adjust grazing regulations to changing times and circumstances.
II. FACTS
Before the TGA was passed, anyone could graze livestock on federal
lands, and there were no limits on the numbers of ammals allowed to
graze.44 As a result, the land was severely overgrazed; causing erosion,
damage to native grass ecosystems, and the spread of noxious weeds.45 Im-
mediately after the TGA's passage, the Interior Department began the pro-
cess of determining who was eligible for a grazing permit.46
When a rancher was awarded a grazing permit, the Secretary identified
in the permit the property owned or controlled by the permit recipient that
served as the base for Is ranching operation, and the maximum amount of
forage (expressed in AUMs) the permit holder's livestock was entitled to
graze on the public lands.47 That maximum amount of forage was known as
the grazing preference. 48 This amount was not based on the carrying capac-
ity of the public land, however, but on the lustoric and present forage pro-
duction of the rancher's privately owned base property 49 The period used
in determining the base property's historic forage production was usually
the five years before 1934.50
41. Id. at 746.
42. Id. at 747.
43. Id. at 750.
44. Coggins, supra note 15, at 2.
45. Id.
46. Public Lands Council 111, 529 U.S. at 734.
47. Public Lands Council 1I, 154 F.3d at 1183 (Tacha, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. McLean v. BLM, 133 LB.L.A. 225, 232 (1995).
50. Id. 232 n.9.
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The grazing preference did not guarantee the right to graze the adjudi-
cated amount of forage every year, but could be fully utilized only when
that amount of forage was available.51 The grazing preference itself could
only be reduced (or increased if the forage production of the federal land
permanently increased52) on a case-by-case basis.53 In the 1978 regulations,
the grazing preference could be reduced if a reduction was "supported by
rangeland studies conducted over time," or the change was "specified in an
applicable land use plan or necessary to manage, maintain, or improve
rangeland productivity "" Banks and other lenders based their loans to pub-
lic lands ranchers on the amount of the grazing preference because it was an
indication of the value of the permit holder's ranching operation.5
III. DISCUSSION OF PRIOR LAW
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v Hodel, an environmen-
tal group sued to stop enforcement of new BLM regulations creating "co-
operative management agreements" with some owners of grazing permits.
56
The agreements contained no terms or conditions specifying how livestock
were to be grazed, such as numbers of stock and seasons of use, and did not
give the BLM authority to modify or cancel the agreements as conditions
on the range warranted.5" The court ruled the agreements violated FLPMA
because "the dominant message and command" of that statute is that the
Secretary "shall prescribe the extent to which livestock grazing shall be
conducted on the public land,"58 and added that "the statutes cannot be
reasonably interpreted" to tie the BLM's hands regarding its authority "to
modify, adjust, suspend, or cancel permits. 5 9 While the TGA and FLPMA
were not the statutes at issue, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. provided the standard for judicial review of adminis-
trative regulations.6" According to Chevron, a court reviewing an adminis-
trative regulation must first ask whether Congress, in the statute the agency
is charged with enforcing, has directly spoken to the precise question at
51. Public Lands Council I, 154 F.3d at 1183 (Tacha, J., dissenting).
52. See generally McLean 133 I.B.L.A. 225.
53. Public Lands Council II, 154 F.3d at 1183 (Tacha, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1184 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4110.3 (1994)).
55. See Public Lands Council v. Babbitt 929 F.Supp. 1436, 1441 ( D. Wyo. 1996) (hereinafter
Public Lands Council I).
56. 618 F.Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
57. Id. at 853.
58. Id. at 869.
59. Id. at 871.
60. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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issue.6 1 If the intent of Congress is clear, then the court must give effect to
that intent, because the courts must carry out the unambiguously expressed
will of Congress.62 But if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise
question at issue, the court must determine whether the regulation is a per-
missible interpretation of the governing statute.63
However, in Alcoa v. Central Lincoln People's Utility District, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a new regulation conflicting with the
agency's established interpretation of a statute is afforded considerably less
deference by the courts, especially if the earlier interpretation was a "con-
temporaneous construction" of the statute; meaning the interpretation was
made soon after the statute's passage.64
IV REASONING
In Public Lands Council, the Supreme Court affirmed the legality of
the permitted use rule by pointing out that the TGA qualifies the Secretary's
duty to safeguard grazing privileges; the Act says those privileges must be
safeguarded only "so far as consistent with the purposes and provisions of
this subchapter."65 This language, together with the fact a grazing perrmt
does not create any "right, title, interest, or estate" in federal lands, makes it
"clear" that a rancher's "interest in permit stability cannot be absolute; and
that the Secretary is reasonably free to determine just how" grazing pnvi-
leges will be safeguarded m accordance with the purposes of the TGA.66
The Court added that these purposes include preventing injury to the public
lands by preventing overgrazing, as well as stabilizing the livestock indus-
try 67 The Court also found that Congress's directive in section 1701(a)(2)
and section 1712 of FLPMA, that land use plans be created for grazing
lands in order to improve their condition, amply supported what the Court
believed to be the permitted use rule's mere "definitional change" affecting
the potential use of such plans.68
The Court also found the permitted use rule valid because prior to
1995 the Secretary routinely reduced individual permit AUMs or cancelled
them entirely, pursuant to his authority to withdraw land from grazing.69
61. Id. at 842.
62. Id. at 842-43.
63. Id. at 843.
64. Hodel, 618 F.Supp. at 870 n. 41 (citing Alurminum Co. of America v. Cent. Lincoln People's
Dist., 467 U.S. 380 (1984)).
65. Public Lands Council 11, 529 U.S. at 741 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315(b)).
66. Id. at 741-42.
67. Id. at 742 (citing Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 742-43.
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Section 315(f) of the TGA permits withdrawal of lands from grazing use
when they are deemed suitable for other uses, and sections 1712 and
1752(c) of FLPMA state that a permit will be renewed only so long as the
land is available for grazing.7° Thus the Secretary, long before 1995, had
the power to lawfully change the conditions of a permit to a rancher's detri-
ment.
The Court's final reason for upholding the permitted use rule den,-ved
from the belief that the Secretary's decision to continue to recognize "sus-
pended use" would not significantly diminish the security of grazing privi-
leges.7 2 The Secretary explained in the Federal Register that the definitional
change wrought by the perrmtted use rule would not cancel "preference,"
and the Secretary's brief maintained that the rule preserves "all elements of
preference. '73 In 1995, the Secretary considered, then abandoned the idea
of eliminating suspended use after receiving comments from the public.7 4 In
its "Final EIS on Rangeland Reform" the BLM stated suspended use will
not only be recognized but given "priority for additional grazing use within
an allotment."75
The Court conceded that the permitted use rule appears to subject graz-
ing privileges to the dictates of land use plans more directly than before, but
pointed out that the Secretary had the authority to make adjustments since
FLPMA was passed in 1976.76 Furthermore, Justice Breyer recognized that
since 1976, all BLM lands have been covered by land use plans, yet the
PLC could not provide a single instance in which grazing privileges have
been jeopardized by a land use plan. 77 In the event a land use plan dimin-
ishes a long-standing forage allocation to a rancher as a result of the new
rule, the opinion stated that the affected rancher could challenge the new
allocation in court.
7 8
The Court next addressed the qualifications rule, and stated its belief
that the deletion of the phrase "engaged in the livestock business" would
70. Id.
71. Id. at 742.
72. Id. at 743.
73. Id. (citing Rangeland Reform '94, 60 Fed. Reg. 9922 (1995) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4,
1780, 4100)).
74. Id. (citing Rangeland Reform '94, 59 Fed. Reg. 14323 (1994) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4,
1780, 4100)).
75. Id. at 743-44 (citing Bureau of Land Management, Rangeland Reform '94: Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement 144 (1994)).
76. Id. at 744.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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not have the dire consequences the ranchers feared.79 The regulation could
not change the TGA, which limits the issuance of grazing permits to "set-
tlers, residents, and other stock owners," so the new rule would not allow
the Secretary to issue grazing permits to persons who did not fit the statu-
tory defimtion.8" Because the regulation and the statute must be read to-
gether when determining the Secretary's authority, and since the qualifica-
tions rule did not by its terms contradict the statute, the Court upheld the
regulation as valid.8 The Court reasoned that the change would not cause a
great many grazing permits to be issued to persons not engaged in the live-
stock business because those already holding permits, all of whom are en-
gaged in the livestock business, receive a preference for renewal of their
permits.
8 2
As for the PLC's claim that "stock owner" means only those engaged
in the livestock business, the Court responded that "stock owner" and
"stock owner engaged in the livestock business" are not obvious synonyms,
"and there is no convincing evidence Congress intended they be considered
as such."83 Parsing the language of section 315(b), the Court pointed out
that two sentences after using "stock owner" in listing those eligible for a
grazing permit, the statute says that among those eligible (including "stock
owners") preference would be given to "landowners engaged in the live-
stock business."84 Why, the Court asked, would Congress add "engaged in
the livestock business," when, using the PLC's interpretation, it would add
nothing if "stock owner" referred only to one engaged in the livestock busi-
ness?85 Quoting a rule of statutory interpretation, the Court then stated "a
statute must be construed in such fashion that every word has some
operative effect."86 The Court said the statutory history of the TGA showed
that Congress "expected that ordinarily permit holders would be ranchers,
who do engage in the livestock business," but did not show any absolute
requirement. 87 Congress may have intended that those involved in the live-
stock business be granted a preference in the granting of permits, but did
not intend to absolutely exclude others from receiving them.
Concerning the PLC's belief the qualifications rule would allow graz-
ing permits to be used for primarily conservation purposes, the Court found
79. 1d at 745.
80. Id
81. Id.




86. Id. (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992)).
87. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 903, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 2835).
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the BLM regulations prohibit a permit holder from failing to make substan-
tial grazing use of his permit for 2 consecutive years.88 If a permit holder
failed to make substantial grazing use for 2 consecutive years, the Secretary
could permanently cancel the unused portion of the permit.89
Finally, the Court addressed the PLC's challenge to the range improve-
ments rule. The Court found that nothing in the TGA prevents the Secretary
from vesting title in the United States to all future permanent range im-
provements constructed pursuant to a cooperative agreement.90 The Secre-
tary's reasons for doing so, said the Court, are administrative efficiency,
and the fact that the original purpose of section 315(f) (ensunng that ranch-
ers compensate nomadic sheepherders) was no longer important.91 In any
event, the Court believed that despite the range improvements rule, the sub-
section retained the meaning the PLC gave it (that ranchers must own some
improvements), because ranchers would still have title to removable range
improvements.92
The Supreme Court was clearly right, given the Secretary's decision
that all elements of preference (including, apparently, the old grazing adju-
dications) will continue to be recognized and protected, to find that the per-
mitted use rule did not contradict the plain language of either the TGA,
FLPMA, or PRIA. But even if the Secretary had decided that the permitted
use rule would effectively eliminate the grazing preference, the law gave
him ample authority to do so. No language in the TGA or FLPMA specifi-
cally directs the Secretary to determine the maximum amount of forage
each permittee is entitled to when available, or to protect established graz-
ing preferences. Nor do those statutes expressly prohibit adjudicating and
recognizing in perpetuity the fixed amount of forage to be allocated to each
permit holder.
In this sense, the Court may have been incorrect in assuming, as it
appeared to do, that Congress spoke directly to this issue in the TGA or
FLPMA. The Supreme Court implied that the TGA, by granting the Secre-
tary the authority to determine (pursuant to the TGA's goals, which include
protecting the rangelands from overgrazing) how to protect grazing pnvi-
leges, gave the BLM express authority to eliminate grazing preferences,
even if the Secretary ultimately elected not to.93 The Court suggested
FLPMA, which directs the Secretary "to specify the numbers of animals to
88. 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(a)(2) (1998).
89. 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-2 (1998).
90. Public Lands Council Ii, 529 U.S. at 750.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 741-42.
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be grazed either directly or by reference to an appropriate allotment
management plan," also gave the Secretary this express authority 94 But this
language does not specifically and unambiguously address the issue of
whether the Secretary is to establish and permanently recogmze the maxi-
mum amount of forage each permit holder may utilize in optimal condi-
tions, based on the Istoric forage production of the permit holder's prop-
erty
The statutory language can be interpreted to mean, as the BLM's 1978
defimtion of "grazing preference" and its clarification between "active" and
"suspended" use suggest, that the Secretary could specify livestock num-
bers lower than the grazing preference temporarily (due to changing range
conditions); but that he must allow use up to the adjudicated maximum
when enough forage is available, and can only change a permit holder's
adjudicated forage level on a case-by-case basis.95 Because there is more
than one reasonable interpretation of the statutes, Congress's intent cannot
be considered unambiguous. The first step in the two-part Chevron test for
review of agency rulemaking, which asks whether Congress's intentions
regarding the precise issue at hand are clear, would not apply to elimination
of the grazing preference.
Because Congress's intent was arguably unclear, the Supreme Court
could have (again, if the Secretary had decided to eliminate grazing prefer-
ences) applied the Chevron test to see whether such a rule was a permissi-
ble construction of the TGA and FLPMA. But even then, the permitted use
rule passes legal muster. The TGA is explicit that permits be issued for ten
year periods, and that permit holders will have a preferential right of re-
newal. 96 In light of this specificity, the TGA's failure to also require per-
nuts to specify a maximum, unvarying forage amount lends support to the
belief the TGA does not mandate that permits do so.
The pre-1978 grazing preferences probably were "recogmzed and ac-
knowledged" grazing privileges, even after the 1978 regulations were
promulgated, but the privilege was created by administrative action rather
than by statute. The privilege required adequate protection only if that was
consistent with the TGA's purposes, one of which is protection of the land
from injury or destruction.97 During the decades in which grazing prefer-
ences were recognized, the condition of the public range remained poor,
mostly because of overgrazing.9" In 1978, a BLM study reported that more
94. Il at 742.
95. Public Lands Council 11, 154 F.3d at 1189 (Tacha, J., dissenting).
96. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1934).
97. 43 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1934).
98. Coggins, supra note 15 at 112.
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than eighty percent of the public range was in less than satisfactory condi-
tion.99 Given these facts, the permitted use rule, had it eliminated the old
grazing preferences, would have been more than a "permissible" construc-
tion of the TGA - it was probably the most reasonable one. The grazing
preference was likely the principal cause of the rangelands' poor condition.
A rule that eliminated recognition of the old grazing adjudication
would certainly have been a more reasonable interpretation of FLPMA's
mandate to manage the public lands for multiple uses and sustained yield,
via land use planning, than continuing to recognize grazing preferences dat-
ing from before FLPMA's passage. Among the values FLPMA seeks to
protect are "the quality of scientific, scenic ecological, environmental"
and water resources.100 Principal uses the BLM must manage in combina-
tion to meet the present and future needs of the American public include
outdoor recreation and wildlife development as well as livestock grazing.'o'
The permitted use rule, had it eliminated the grazing preference, would,
unlike grazing adjudications made before 1978, be consistent with these
policies because the old grazing preferences were created when the prnci-
pal consideration was the need of the livestock owners for forage.
Considering the increase in outdoor recreation and wildlife "utiliza-
tion" (meaning wildlife watching as well as hunting and fishing) on the
public lands since the time the grazing preferences were adjudicated, those
preferences no longer accurately reflect the changed needs of the American
public. Allowing their continued use threatens some of the values listed in
section 1701(a)(8),' 2 especially the quality of ecological, environmental,
and water resources. Excessive livestock grazing leaves less forage for
wildlife, leads to the introduction of non-native plants and the extirpation of
native ones, and damages water quality 103 FLPMA, by permitting the Sec-
retary to create AMPs which prescribe "the manner in, and extent to, which
livestock operations will be conducted in order to meet the multiple-use,
sustained yield" objectives of the Act, expressly allows grazing to be regu-
lated for multiple use, sustained yield management. 104
As for the effects on the stability of the livestock industry from elini-
nating the grazing preference, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (assum-
ing, erroneously, the rule eliminated the grazing preference) pointed out
that only twenty-two percent of western cattlemen, and nineteen percent of
99. Brief of Amici at 26 (No. 98-1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1122 at 10 (1978)).
100. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1976).
101. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(l) (1976).
102. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1998).
103. Brief of Amici at 26 (No. 98-1991) (citing National Research Council, Rangeland Heaith:
New Methods to Classify, Inventory and Monitor Rangelands 25 (1994)).
104. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(k)(1) (1998).
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western sheep producers, have federal grazing permits. 10 5
The permitted use rule, if it had eliminated the grazing preference,
would have conflicted with the BLM's established practice of recognizing
grazing preferences adjudicated before its 1978 regulations. 10 6 Even f this
practice, mentioned explicitly by the BLM only in the Federal Register (it
was never codified in the C.F.R.), rises to the level of an "interpretation,"
an "imtial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone the
agency must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its
policy on a continuing basis."'
' 0 7
In upholding the qualifications rule, the Court pointed to BLM regula-
tions mandating that permit holders make substantial grazing use on their
allotments for two consecutive years or else face cancellation of the unused
forage. 1°' While the Court believed this regulation would prevent grazing
permits from being used by persons who intended to allow little grazing,' 0 9
the regulation still leaves open the possibility that conservation groups
could obtain grazing permits, then graze their lands every other year. From
the environmentalists' standpoint, the land would still benefit from the lack
of grazing in alternating years. In the years when grazing must occur, con-
servatiomst permit holders would certainly try to test the limits of what
constitutes "substantial use" by grazing as few animals as possible without
getting their permit revoked. The "substantial use" threshold could be met
by levels of grazing use that, while not minimal, are well below what a
stock owner "engaged in the livestock business," would ordinarily reach.
Tlus, of course, would depend on future courts' determination of what con-
stitutes "substantial use."
V CONCLUSION
The permitted use rule, even without the Secretary's decision to pro-
tect the old adjudicated grazing levels, is a more reasonable interpretation
of the TGA and FLPMA than the BLM's practice of recognizing the right
of each permit holder to graze up to the amount of forage determined in a
decades-old adjudication. These adjudications were largely made before
FLPMA was passed, when, under the TGA, "the BLM emphasized accom-
modation of ranchers' desires, rather than improvement of range condi-
105. Public Lands Council II, 154 F.3d at 71-72 n.5, (citing Bruce M. Pendery, Reforming Live-
stock Grazing on the Public Domain: Ecosystem Management Based Standards & Guidelines Blaze a
New Path for Range Management, 27 ENv-r. L. 513, 523 (1997)).
106. Il at 1185 (Tacha, J. dissenting).
107. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-864.
108. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4130.2(a), 4130.2 (g) (1998).
109. Public Lands Council III, 529 U.S. at 747.
2001] 159
160 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
tions."o Recognition of grazing preferences failed to protect the rangeland
from deterioration, as section 1901(a)(1) of PRIA implicitly acknowl-
edged."' Furthermore, grazing preferences reflected priorities that were
drastically altered by FLPMA, which requires management of the public
lands for multiple uses, not all of them compatible with the levels of live-
stock grazing granted by grazing preferences. Ranchers would still have
been able to challenge any reduction in their grazing use had the permitted
use rule eliminated the grazing preference, as the Supreme Court pointed
out. 1 12 The creation of AMPs by the BLM under section 1752(d) of
FLPMA 1 3 provided permit holders with a sufficiently individualized "adju-
dication" of the amount of forage they are permitted to graze, because
AUMs have to be tailored to the particular area they encompass. Also, per-
mit holders must be consulted during the creation of an AMP 114 The pro-
cess of creating AMPs thus would not have materially departed from the
BLM's prior practice of changing grazing preferences only on a case-by-
case basis.
The Court was possibly mistaken in assuming that the qualifications
rule, by eliminating the requirement that permit holders be engaged in the
livestock business, would not result in grazing permits being acquired by
conservation-minded organizations and individuals who will then use them
to reduce grazing on their allotments. The BLM regulations the Court relied
upon for this assumption would still permit grazing use to be substantially
curtailed by the permit holders.
110. Coggns, supra note 15, at 2.
111. 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(1) (1998).
112. Public Lands Council 111, 529 U.S. at 744.
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d) (1978).
114. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(k) (1976).
